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1 Introduction
Due to the skyrocketing of household debt to asset ratios, credit booms have become a source of nancial
stability risks (Jordà et al., 2016). On the one hand, the growth of banksbalance sheet and the upward
trend in the share of the income of the nancial sector in total income have given housing nance a prominent
role in the modern macroeconomy (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al., 2013). On the other hand,
excessive exposure to risk and slow economic recoveries are just the other "faces" of "too big too fail" nancial
institutions and the consequences of debt overhang (Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009; Agnello and Sousa, 2012;
Agnello et al., 2015a).
Bracke (2013) shows that likelihood of the end of housing downturns is lower when previous upturns have
been unusually long. Bénétrix et al. (2012) use a probit model and also nd that the probability of a house
price slump ending is higher when the pre-slump house price upturn is smaller. In addition, Bénétrix et
al. (2012) and Bracke (2013) highlight the importance of some macroeconomic variables in shaping housing
cycles. Bénétrix et al. (2012) also emphasise that housing slumps are shorter when housing supply is more
rigid and nancial institutions are more developed.
We move one step forward vis-à-vis the work of Agnello et al. (2015b) in that we use not only the
continuous-time Weibull model, but also di¤erent discrete-time duration models, which contemplate the
incorporation of time-variant explanatory variables. Additionally, we improve vis-a-vis the study by Agnello
et al. (forthcoming) in that we explicitly condition the duration of the various phases of the housing market
cycle on the occurrence of di¤erent typologies of recession episodes.
We nd that nancial crisis recessions are associated with shorter housing booms and their e¤ects are
more detrimental for the duration of these spells than normal recessions. Moreover, longer housing busts
somewhat accrue to the occurrence of systemic nancial crises. Consequently, recessions preceded by booms
in mortgage credit are more prone to coincide with protracted slumps in the housing market.
2 Econometric framework
To implement discrete-time methods, we can start with a continuous-time duration model and, then,
derive the appropriate estimator for data grouped into intervals. Let us dene the discrete-time hazard rate
as Pit = Pr[Ti = tjTi > t; xit], where Ti is the discrete random variable representing the uncensored time
at which the event ends and xit is a vector of time-varying explanatory variables. Prentice and Gloeckler
(1978) show that the discrete-time proportional hazard function can be expressed as
Pit = 1  exp
 ht exp(0xit) = 1  exp   exp(t + 0xit) ; (1)
which is equivalent to the so called complementary log-log (or cloglog) function ln [  ln(1  Pit)] = t+0xit,
where t (= lnht) represents the logarithm of an unspecied (baseline hazard) function of time, xit is a vector
of time-varying explanatory variables and the vector of coe¢ cients  is a (K  1) vector of parameters to be
estimated.
To estimate the discrete-time analogue to the Weibull model the model, t represents , i.e. t = lnht =
2
+ (p  1) ln t, where ht represents the hazard function, which measures the rate at which housing booms,
busts or normal times will end at t, given that they lasted until that moment. The discrete-time log-likelihood
function for a sample of i = 1; :::; n spells can be written as
lnL() =
nX
i=1
tiX
j=1
yit ln

Pij
1  Pij

+
nX
i=1
tiX
j=1
ln (1  Pij) ; (2)
where the dummy variable yit is equal to 1 if the housing boom, bust or normal time i ends at time t, and
0 otherwise. Plugging equation (1) into equation (2) and using the adequate specication for the baseline
hazard function, one can estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood.
3 Data
Our analysis covers a sample of 20 industrialized countries over the period 1970Q1-2012Q2.1The main
data used in our study consists of spells which measure the duration (in quarters) of housing booms, busts
or normal times (Dur). Such episodes are identied using the quarterly series of real housing price indices as
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). Basically, we identify
housing booms and busts as major and persistent deviations from long-term trends. The identication
procedure consists of the following steps. First, we smooth quarterly house price growth using a ve-quarter
moving average. This avoids capturing high-frequency changes. Second, we run a preliminary detection of
upturns and downturns in real housing prices by looking at periods of consecutive positive and negative
growth in real housing prices. Finally, the price change in an upturn (downturn) is required to exceed (fall
below) a minimum (maximum) threshold before it can be labelled as a boom (bust). This threshold is set to
15%, which is close to the average size of upturns and downturns over the entire sample period and assumes
that these episodes are symmetric.2 Normal times in the housing market cycle cover all non-boom and
non-bust episodes, which implies that this phase includes both upturns and downturns in real housing prices
that are not identied as booms and busts.
In order to investigate the role played by crisis episodes on the duration of the di¤erent phases of the
housing market cycle, we add dummy variables (one at time) to the set of regressors. These control for the
occurrence of 1) systemic nancial crises (SystemicCrises), 2) normal recessions (NormalCrises), and 3)
nancial crisis recessions (FinancialCrises), as described in Jordà et al. (2016). Due to the lack of data,
these crisis episodes are coded as missing for Greece, Ireland, Korea and New Zealand.
As additional explanatory variables, we consider: (i) the real GDP growth rate (RGDP ), (ii) the lending
interest rate (LR); (iii) the growth rate of domestic credit to the private sector (CR). These determinants
of the housing market cycle are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Finally, we construct a dummy variable (European) that takes the value of one in European countries
1Appendix A provides the list of countries included in the analysis.
2We have also considered di¤erent thresholds for housing booms and housing busts. For instance, the threshold has been
set equal to the average size of housing upturns and housing downturns over the entire sample of analysis (i.e. 23% and  11%,
respectively). The results remained qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged and are available upon request.
3
and zero otherwise, which allows us to test the existence of signicant di¤erences in the length of housing
booms/busts in European countries vis-à-vis non-European countries.
4 Empirical results
The empirical ndings are reported in Tables 1 (housing booms), 2 (housing busts) and 3 (normal times).
Columns 1-2 report the ndings associated with the estimation of a continuous-time Weibull model, while
Columns 3-4 show the summary of the results of the discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the
continuous-time Weibull model. In Columns 5-6, the Cloglog regressions are performed using natural cubic
splines of the hazard functions.
In Table 1, we nd that systemic nancial crises (SystemicCrises) are normally associated with shorter
housing booms, even though the e¤ect is signicant only at the 10% level. However, both normal recessions
(NormalCrises) and nancial crisis recessions (FinancialCrises) are strongly signicant across the various
duration models under consideration. Their coe¢ cients are positive, thereby, implying that the occurrence of
these types of recessions has a large and signicant impact on the length of housing booms: this phase of the
housing market cycle is considerably shortened when such crisis episodes emerge. Interestingly, the Cloglog
regressions that are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions reveal that the coe¢ cient
associated with nancial crisis recessions is larger in magnitude than in the case of normal recessions. This
result is consistent with the work of Jordà et al. (2016), which shows that the former episodes have a more
damaging e¤ect on the macroeconomy than the latter episodes. Indeed, the authors argue that nancial
crisis recessions tend to be followed by slower economic recoveries.
Table 2 presents the results for housing busts. As the dummy variables for normal recessions (NormalCrises)
and nancial crisis recessions (FinancialCrises) are omitted, we are not able to assess their impact. Despite
this, the empirical ndings suggest that the occurrence of systemic nancial crises tends to make housing
busts longer: the coe¢ cient associated with SystemicCrises is negative and signicant in the case of the
continuous-time (Weibull) duration model. Thus, periods of strong rise in real estate lending typically lead
to deeper recessionary episodes. Yet, no signicant e¤ect is observed in the discrete-time duration models.
Table 3 reports the ndings for normal times. In this case, the dummy variable for systemic nan-
cial crisis recessions (SystemicCrises) is omitted, but we can investigate the e¤ects of normal recessions
(NormalCrises) and nancial crisis recessions (FinancialCrises). The results show that, although normal
recessions do not impact the duration of normal times in the housing market in a signicant manner, nan-
cial crisis recessions lead to a large and signicant reduction of their length: the coe¢ cient associated with
FinancialCrises is positive and large in magnitude, thus, implying that the occurrence of nancial crisis
recessions unequivocally increases the likelihood of the end of normal times in the housing market.
To assess the economic signicance of these results, note that the impact of a change of any given
explanatory variable, xit, on the hazard rate is computed, approximately, as exit . As the coe¢ cient associated
with SystemicCrises ranges between 1:205 and 1:373 (in the case of housing booms) and is equal to  2:274
(in the case of housing busts), this implies that (i) the occurrence of systemic nancial crises leads to a two-
to three-fold increase in the likelihood of the end of a housing boom; and (ii) the same episodes prolong the
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duration of housing busts by almost 90%.
Finally, with regard to the various macroeconomic variables included as regressors, the empirical evi-
dence uncovers four main ndings. First, an acceleration of real GDP growth prolongs (shortens) housing
booms (busts) or promotes the transition from normal times to housing booms. Consequently, a strong
economic performance, as well as growth-enhancing policies, can boost the recovery from a prolonged period
of downturn in real housing prices, but also serve as a catalyst for a sharp appreciation of real housing
prices. Second, a tightening of money market conditions reduces the length of housing booms. Therefore,
central bank actions - for instance, interest rate hikes - can be particularly e¤ective at mitigating periods
of housing price over-valuation and eliminating large deviations of housing prices from their fundamental
values. Third, a rise in the growth rate of credit to the domestic sector does not signicantly impact the
housing market cycle. Thus, as in Agnello et al. (forthcoming), the impact of credit on the housing market
cycle (and the length of its various phases) mainly operates via changes in its cost than via changes in its
availability. Fourth, housing busts and normal time spells are typically shorter in European countries than in
non-European countries. This result conrms the evidence provided by Agnello et al. (2015b, forthcoming).
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. ]
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. ]
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE. ]
5 Conclusions
Using quarterly data for 20 industrialized countries and various duration models, we investigate the
impact of recession episodes on the dynamics of the housing market cycle. In particular, we condition the
duration of housing booms, housing busts and normal times in the housing markets on the occurrence of
recessions, and distinguish between systemic crisis episodes and normal versus nancial crisis recessions.
We nd that both nancial crisis recessions and normal recessions considerably shorten the duration of
housing booms, but the former episodes tend to have a more damaging e¤ect than the latter. The length of
normal times in the housing market cycle is also signicantly reduced when nancial crisis recessions occur.
Additionally, systemic nancial crises make housing busts somewhat longer. Therefore, recessions that
are preceded by booms in mortgage credit have a particularly detrimental impact on the dynamics of the
housing market cycle.
From a policy perspective, our work suggests that macro-prudential policies can be an important shield
of the economy vis-a-vis the deleterious e¤ect of housing busts and the nancial stability risks associated
with housing booms. Moreover, given the impact of monetary policy on the length of the various phases of
the housing market cycle, a policy framework encompassing a mix of monetary and macro-prudential policies
can prove particularly e¤ective at preventing and/or dampening boom-bust cycles.
While providing valuable information on the timing and the length of the di¤erent phases of the housing
market cycle, this article opens new avenues for further research. A promising direction consists on rigorously
assessing the role played by housing nance regulation in shortening the duration of boom-bust episodes. In
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addition, in light of the importance of nancialisation in the housing sector, a thorough understanding of
the housing market cycle requires the ability to account for the impact of securitisation and the degree of
liberalisation of the mortgage market. We leave this work for the future.
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Appendix
A List of Tables
Table 1: Continuous-time (Weibull) and discrete-time (Cloglog) estimations for housing booms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p 2:036+;c 2:243+;c 1:917+;c 2:254+;c Spline1 0:180 0:213
(0:211) (0:204) (0:373) (0:381) (0:043) (0:041)
Spline2  0:230  0:279
(0:110) (0:121)
Spline3 1:020 1:242
(0:584) (0:661)
RGDP  0:189  0:202 RGDP  0:185  0:198
(0:046) (0:045) (0:046) (0:044)
CR 0:008  0:019 CR 0:006  0:019
(0:013) (0:026) (0:013) (0:025)
LR 0:333 0:338 LR 0:330 0:331
(0:076) (0:066) (0:079) (0:070)
European 0:333 0:139  0:432  0:059 European  0:446  0:070
(0:372) (0:355) (0:352) (0:335) (0:352) (0:336)
SystemicCrises 1:205 1:271 SystemicCrises 1:373
(0:512) (0:730) (0:741)
NormalCrises 1:960 1:786 NormalCrises 1:876
(0:353) (0:562) (0:517)
FinancialCrises 1:770 3:078 FinancialCrises 3:171
(0:435) (0:716) (0:671)
Constant  6:838  7:936  11:337  12:826 Constant  8:797  9:804
(0:813) (0:823) (1:697) (1:650) (1:152) (0:946)
LogL  39:99  35:28  137:0  127:7 LogL  138:3  128:6
AIC 87:98 80:57 288:08 271:30 AIC 294:67 277:27
SBIC 95:47 89:93 322:88 311:08 SBIC 339:42 326:98
LRI     0:226 0:279 LRI 0:219 0:273
Observ: 48 48 1066 1066 Observ: 1066 1066
Ended     42 42 Ended 42 42
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
booms. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(2) present the results of a continuous-time Weibull model. Columns
(3)-(4) show the results of a discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model. In Columns
(5)-(6), the Cloglog regressions are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions, with knots at periods 1, 30,
45 and 68.
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Table 2: Continuous-time (Weibull) and discrete-time (Cloglog) estimations for housing busts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p 2:503+;c 2:023+;c 2:085+;c 1:986+;c Spline1 0:240 0:230
(0:523) (0:310) (0:328) (0:335) (0:059) (0:067)
Spline2  0:769  0:741
(0:226) (0:255)
Spline3 2:970 2:830
(0:977) (1:057)
RGDP 0:467 0:482 RGDP 0:507 0:506
(0:165) (0:178) (0:186) (0:194)
CR  0:027  0:020 CR  0:024  0:019
(0:085) (0:081) (0:085) (0:081)
LR 0:048 0:041 LR 0:046 0:038
(0:044) (0:043) (0:049) (0:049)
European 2:725 1:937 1:479 1:440 European 0:807 0:649
(1:087) (0:861) (1:066) (1:033) (0:923) (0:851)
SystemicCrises  2:274 0:052 SystemicCrises 0:729
(0:569) (0:882) (1:294)
NormalCrises Omitted Omitted NormalCrises Omitted
F inancialCrises Omitted Omitted F inancialCrises Omitted
Constant  10:479  8:404  8:158  7:714 Constant  7:809  7:316
(2:487) (1:581) (1:518) (1:538) (1:426) (1:300)
LogL  18:57  22:42  80:94  79:38 LogL  77:09  75:52
AIC 43:14 50:84 175:89   AIC 172:18  
SBIC 47:02 54:73 206:30   SBIC 211:27  
LRI     0:131   LRI 0:172  
Observ: 27 27 569 508 Observ: 569 508
Ended     22 22 Ended 22 22
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of housing
busts. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual delays
in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(2) present the results of a continuous-time Weibull model. Columns (3)-(4)
show the results of a discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model. In Columns (5)-(6),
the Cloglog regressions are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions, with knots at periods 1, 30, 45 and
85.
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Table 3: Continuous-time (Weibull) and discrete-time (Cloglog) estimations for normal times.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p 1:386+;d 1:442+;d 1:192 1:280 Spline1 0:013 0:023
(0:169) (0:155) (0:195) (0:176) (0:038) (0:036)
Spline2  0:049  0:081
(0:193) (0:188)
Spline3 0:246 0:342
(0:730) (0:719)
RGDP 0:197 0:199 RGDP 0:200 0:200
(0:093) (0:086) (0:091) (0:087)
CR 0:027 0:025 CR 0:027 0:026
(0:017) (0:017) (0:017) (0:017)
LR 0:032 0:028 LR 0:038 0:034
(0:033) (0:038) (0:035) (0:039)
European 1:391 1:417 1:346 1:386 European 1:425 1:425
(0:475) (0:462) (0:414) (0:424) (0:454) (0:445)
SystemicCrises Omitted Omitted SystemicCrises Omitted
NormalCrises 0:351  0:955 NormalCrises  0:925
(0:289) (1:023) (1:011)
FinancialCrises 2:335 1:656 FinancialCrises 1:355
(0:361) (0:468) (0:457)
Constant  5:499  5:751  5:047  5:250 Constant  4:904  4:979
(0:781) (0:717) (0:778) (0:778) (0:725) (0:742)
LogL  56:35  54:85  122:9  122:2 LogL  122:6  122:2
AIC 118:70 117:71   260:31 AIC   264:38
SBIC 124:32 125:19   297:17 SBIC   310:46
LRI       0:074 LRI   0:074
Observ: 48 48 721 741 Observ: 721 741
Ended     32 32 Ended 32 32
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country) for the estimated coe¢ cients are in parentheses. Signicance level at
which the null hypothesis is rejected: , 1%; , 5%; and , 10%. The sign + indicates that p is signicantly higher than
1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust standard errors; d, c and i, indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% level, respectively. AIC = 2[ LogL + k] and SBIC = 2[ LogL + (k=2)LogN ], where
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of observations. LRI is
the likelihood ratio index or pseudo-R2 (LRI = 1  LogL=LogL0, where L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors).
Ended indicates de number of non-zero observations in the Cloglog model, which also corresponds to the number of normal
time spells. The economic variables are lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual
delays in the reporting of economic data. Columns (1)-(2) present the results of a continuous-time Weibull model. Columns
(3)-(4) show the results of a discrete-time Cloglog model that is analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model. In Columns
(5)-(6), the Cloglog regressions are performed using natural cubic splines of the hazard functions, with knots at periods 1, 35,
60 and 107.
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A Appendix
Table 4: List of countries included in the sample.
Australia France Japan Spain
Belgium Germany Korea Sweden
Canada Greece Netherlands Switzerland
Denmark Ireland New Zealand United Kingdom
Finland Italy Norway United States
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